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INTRODUCTION
Fisheries is an activity in which biology, ecology,
policy (management), economy and other disciplines
are brought together. Tsikliras et al. (2013) described
a series of analogies between global crises in fisheries
and the wider economy. The authors, among others,
used certain countries currently in recession as exam-
ples of such analogies. We share this rationale, and
we believe that such an approach can provide fresh
insights into the management of natural resources.
We contribute to this effort by offering additional
observations, while simultaneously pointing out the
need to confront the issue at the case level. This
approach aims to facilitate specific solutions which
take into account structural characteristics and local
peculiarities and can contribute to overcoming the
current impasse. To this end, we provide a brief
analysis of relevant aspects of the Greek economic
crisis and fisheries management in the country.
GREEK ECONOMIC CRISIS AND FISHERIES:
GENERAL CONTEXT
In recent years, the world economy has been in tur-
moil. The global financial crisis of 2007−2009 was fol-
lowed by the sovereign debt crisis of 2011−2013,
interrupted by a modest recovery in 2009−2011, and
revisited by the dramatic Greece−European Union
(EU) confrontation in 2015. Several authors have
labelled this global crisis the ‘Great Recession’ (Jenk-
ins et al. 2013), as it affected large areas of the globe,
and because its duration and depth exceeded those
of previous downturns globally. In Europe, the size of
the economy in 2013 was still below its 2008 level
(Eurostat 2015).
Greece stands out among the countries worst
affected by the global economic crisis, as the depth
and duration of the Greek crisis were far greater than
those experienced elsewhere. The Greek economy
has been in recession for 8 consecutive years (time of
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writing April 2016). The latest official figures reveal
that the size of the economy has contracted by 26.4%
in real terms relative to 2007 (Eurostat 2015). The loss
in output, amounting to a dramatic fall in living stan-
dards, has been far greater than the equivalent con-
traction in other southern European economies (Italy:
−8.5%; Spain: −6.3%; Portugal: −8.2%) or Ireland
(−6.7%) over the same period.
What were the causes of the Eurozone crisis in
Greece, and how did they differ from those leading
to crises in other countries? While this is a politically
contested and hotly debated topic, the emerging
consensus (Baldwin et al. 2015) has identified macro -
economic imbalances in the Eurozone as being at
the root of the crisis. Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy
and Ireland all ran significant current account (i.e.
mostly trade) deficits in the years preceding the sov-
ereign debt crisis. However, Greece experienced far
greater trouble because it amassed huge fiscal as
well as trade deficits. In contrast, in Ireland, Spain
and elsewhere, governments had maintained a
more sound fiscal position, which deteriorated only
when they were forced to bail out the banks threat-
ened with collapse in the context of a housing
 bubble.
Similarly, Greek fisheries (like those of other
Mediterranean countries) present several funda-
mental differences compared to those of the Euro-
pean Atlantic, associated with (1) distinct environ-
mental conditions, (2) structure of the fishing fleet
and consequently (3) composition and volume of
catches (e.g. Smith & Garcia 2014). The Mediterran-
ean Sea is a semi-enclosed, oligotrophic basin com-
pared to the rich adjacent oceanic areas, with a
prominent west to east gradient in oligotrophy (Bosc
et al. 2004). It supports a very large biodiversity of
species (5.5 to 7% of the world’s marine fauna;
Relini 2003), while large mono-specific fisheries
contribute only little to the total landings in contrast
to fisheries in the open oceans. Fishery production
in the EU’s Mediterranean and Black Sea waters is
(by weight) 10.5% of total EU (excluding overseas)
fisheries (Eurostat 2013); interestingly, however, the
fishing fleets of EU Mediterranean countries are
characterized by a relatively large number of ves-
sels. Greek Seas (eastern Ionian, Aegean, Cretan,
Libyan and Levantine Seas), located in one of the
most oligotrophic regions within the Mediterranean,
support the largest fishing fleet among the EU
countries in terms of the number of vessels. In this
sense, Greek fisheries are similar to the other Medi-
terranean fisheries but probably re present the most
extreme case.
SMALL FIRM SIZE AND SMALL-SCALE FISHING
Greece stands out among all European countries in
terms of exceptionally small firm size. Very small busi-
nesses (with 1 to 9 employees) account for 86% of all
non-banking firms, and 27% of all employment in that
sector (with an average of 2.3 employees per com-
pany). In addition, self-employed workers with no em-
ployees account for approximately 25% of the total
employment in Greece, in comparison to circa 10% in
the EU as a whole. In Italy, the next major country with
a large number of own-account workers, the equiva-
lent figure is 16% (note that these figures do not in-
clude ‘moonlighting’, i.e. employees with a second job
in informal self-employment, such as school teachers
offering private lessons). On the whole, Greece pres-
ents the highest share of ‘micro-enterprises’, defined
as those enterprises employing 0 to 9 workers (i.e. in-
cluding both very small firms with employees and per-
sonal companies of self-employed workers). Indeed, a
recent survey showed that in 2012, micro-enterprises
in Greece accounted for 96.4% of all enterprises and
57.6% of the workforce (ILO 2014).
This is mirrored in Greek fisheries. In spite of low
production, the Greek fleet is the largest in the EU,
comprising 15 165 artisanal vessels (below 24 m), dis-
persed along hundreds of landing sites on the coast-
line and islands, and 534 semi-industrial ones (mid-
dle-sized trawlers and purse-seine vessels; Kavadas
et al. 2013). In all, Greece accounts for 20% of the EU
fleet but only 1.3% of EU fisheries production (Euro-
stat 2013). In addition, an unknown number of recre-
ational fishing boats and fishers operate with un -
known landings (unpublished estimates from the
Greek Ministry of Maritime Affairs indicate more
than 87 000 licences for recreational fishing vessels in
2010). The total impact of the artisanal fleet is consid-
erable. Annual landings in Greece are approximately
24 000 t for bottom trawlers, 51 000 t for purse seiners
(targeting small and medium-sized pelagic fish) and
72 000 t for artisanal vessels (using a great variety of
gear and targeting numerous species; Anonymous
2008). However, landings per artisanal vessel and
income per fisher are both very low. The similarities
between Greek fisheries and the wider economy, in
terms of the large number of production units of low
size and low efficiency, are clear.
INFORMATION DEFICIENCIES
Successful policies require up-to-date and accurate
information, but for structural reasons Greek fish-
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eries and the wider economy both suffer from infor-
mation deficiencies. Small firm size is intimately
linked to unreported income and, eventually, tax
evasion. Most undocumented workers tend to be
employed in micro enterprises in tourism, construc-
tion and domestic work. For instance, the proportion
of employees found not to be regularly insured in
firms investigated by the Labour Inspectorate has
steadily increased in recent years, from 25% in 2010
to 30% in 2011 and more than 36% in 2012. On the
other hand, self-employed workers are known to
under-report their income for tax purposes. For
example, Matsaganis et al. (2012) found that the pro-
portion of real income not reported by the self-
employed is nearly 40% (more than 80% in the case
of farmers), while in the case of employees earning
wages or salaries it is below 1%. Similarly, Artavanis
et al. (2012) estimated that the rate of income under-
reporting was highest among the so-called ‘liberal
professions’: 55% in the case of the legal profession,
58% in the case of engineering and related profes-
sions and 59% in the case of the medical profession.
The tendency of self-employed workers to evade
taxes is hardly a Greek phenomenon. In the USA,
where tax administration is more efficient (and law
enforcement is more strict), the rate of under-report-
ing of self-employment earnings was estimated to
be 58.6% in 1988 (Slemrod & Yitzhaki 2002) and
57% in 2001 (Slemrod 2007), compared to 0.5 and 1%,
respectively, in the case of wages or salaries. The key
difference is structural: in Greece, as  mentioned above,
the self-employed account for 25% of the workforce,
while in the USA the equivalent figure is 8%.
In addition, widespread clientelism and favouritism
in the public sector contribute to a culture of secrecy,
militating against transparency, e.g. via the collection
and subsequent release of sound data. For instance,
data on the number of public employees only began
to be released in July 2010 in Greece, while data on
the number of pensioners (as opposed to the number
of pensions, given that some pensioners receive more
than 1 pension) only began to be known in January
2014. The absence of knowledge and information
meant that selected groups could secretly be favoured.
Greek fisheries reflect many of the above features.
Public authorities have an insufficient picture of the
size, composition and distribution of landings to man-
age fisheries properly. Greek statistical authorities do
not monitor professional vessels smaller than 12 m
(which encompasses approximately 10 000 artisanal
vessels, i.e. more than half of the fishing fleet), nor
the recreational fishery. Nonetheless, an unknown
number of professional fishers are not fully active,
relying on secondary activities for supplementary in -
come. Moreover, the Greek fishing fleet is dispersed
along the extensive coastline (>16 000 km), any point
of which is a potential landing site for the low daily
catch of each vessel. Inspection by coastal authorities
is very difficult, compliance is low, and policy imple-
mentation is inefficient.
Small production by a large number of individu-
als/vessels results in high levels of unreported land-
ings (an analogy to unreported income). In recent
years, it is probable that the size of recreational fish-
eries has grown further, to compensate for loss of
income elsewhere. However, there is no monitoring
scheme for the recreational fishery. The most reliable
source of information is the fisheries data collection
scheme under data collection regulation / data col-
lection framework (DCR/DCF) (EU 2000, 2008), but
these EU regulations have only been implemented
sporadically (from 2003 to 2006, 2008 and 2014). An
important consequence is that the impact of each
fleet segment is unknown, and the state of the Greek
stocks is not assessed by the relevant bodies (e.g.
STECF 2015). This misreporting does not reflect a
deliberate effort to mask the situation by reporting
false data, as in several other countries (Tsikliras et
al. 2013), but nevertheless, the existing situation is
not recorded.
POLICIES AND MANAGEMENT
Early stock assessment methods and fisheries man-
agement were mainly developed for large monospe-
cific fisheries of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (e.g.
see Beverton 1998). Most of the early analyses in
Mediterranean fisheries used classic methods. How-
ever, neither were the available data always appro-
priate nor were the methods used always suitable for
the multi-gear and multi-species nature of these fish-
eries (Lleonart & Maynou 2003). Similarly, manage-
ment is not adaptive (Lleonart & Maynou 2003), and
policy measures are mainly directed at trawlers and
purse seiners, i.e. imitating those applied in Atlantic
fisheries. It seems that in a multi-species, multi-gear
fishery, policies restricted to these fishing fleet cate-
gories are of limited potential; it is impossible to
reverse over-exploitation without also giving atten-
tion to fleet segments responsible for the majority of
landings, and without allocating management meas-
ures according to the impact of each fleet on the
stocks. Even though fisheries research and data col-
lection have advanced in recent years, management
has failed to improve the status of stocks in Greece
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and the Mediterranean (Vasilakopoulos et al. 2014),
in contrast to the NE Atlantic, where several success-
ful management plans (e.g. for North Sea herring)
have been implemented (Fernandes & Cook 2013).
This brings to mind the recent application of ‘struc-
tural reforms’ by Greek governments following the
sovereign crisis and EU bailout. The failure of  policies
imposed by the EU−European Central Bank− Inter-
national Monetary Fund troika to kick-start the
Greek economy may be seen as another manifesta-
tion of a general pattern. In the absence of a domes-
tically grown reform project, suitable for the specific
case of Greece, the attempt to modernise the country
was imposed externally, on the basis of reform pro-
posals elaborated in very different national contexts.
The polarization of domestic politics between those
tacitly accepting vs. those vehemently rejecting the
bailout package helped divert attention from the
more fundamental matter of the actual content of the
reforms needed for Greece to exit the current crisis.
The structure of the Greek economy makes reform
difficult. Large numbers of self-employed workers,
and a myriad of small firms that are only profitable
when they flout regulations, create powerful political
constituencies against fighting tax evasion and gen-
eral law enforcement. Moreover, these constituen-
cies can appeal to the smaller (average) income
groups concerned, compared for example with ‘oli-
garchs’. Clearly, fighting illegality in high places is
crucial for diffusing a sense that the law is equal for
all. Nevertheless, ‘oligarchs’ are so few and far be -
tween, that — from a fiscal point of view — fighting
tax evasion among the middle classes (e.g. the liberal
professions or small firms) is much more effective in
terms of increasing the tax intake (Matsaganis et al.
2012).
As pointed out above, small-scale production and
information deficiencies are shared by both Greek
fisheries and the wider economy, setting them apart
from the fisheries and economy of other European
countries. Yet policy solutions, imposed in the con-
text of Greece’s bailout (or selected based on fish-
eries management in the Atlantic) seem more geared
to the experience of other economies (and fisheries
sectors) than de signed for the specific case of Greece.
Local solutions, informed by international experience
but not attempting to import it wholesale, may be
more successful in terms of public acceptance, better
enforcement and removing obstacles to modernisa-
tion and effective management.
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